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Public opinion on climate change: belief and concern, 
issue salience and support for government action 
Sam Crawley, Hilde Coffé and Ralph Chapman 
Climate policy across the developed world remains inadequate, despite high levels of 
concern about climate change among the public. Yet public opinion on climate change is 
complex, with individuals differing on three key opinion dimensions: belief and concern, 
issue salience, and support for government action. In this study, we investigate how 
these dimensions intersect at the individual level. Based on data from an online survey 
conducted in 2018 in the United Kingdom (N = 787), a latent class analysis reveals that 
there are five climate change opinion publics. The two largest publics have strong 
beliefs that climate change is occurring, but view it as a low salience issue, or are wary 
of government action to address it. We also investigate sociopolitical covariates of each 
public. By providing a detailed picture of climate change views, these findings can help 
us to better understand the relationship between public opinion and climate policy. 
Keywords: climate change, public opinion, United Kingdom, issue salience 
Introduction 
While climate change is a problem that requires immediate and substantial action, to 
date, pledges from national governments to reduce emissions have been inadequate. 
Almost none of the countries party to the Paris agreement are on track to keep 
emissions to a level compatible with the goal of remaining well under the maximum of 
2°C of warming by the end of the 21st century. While a variety of factors may account 
for this lack of action, in liberal democracies, the views of the public often play a role in 
determining the policies that governments select (Burstein, 2003; Shapiro, 2011; 
Soroka and Wlezien, 2004), and previous research suggests that there is a link between 
public opinion and climate policy (Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008; Vandeweerdt et 
al., 2016). It is important, then, to properly understand the nature of the public’s views 
on climate change. 
Previous studies have examined a range of dimensions of climate change 
opinion, including the belief that climate change is occurring, degree of concern about 
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climate change, and the salience of the issue (e.g. Egan and Mullin, 2017; Lewis et al., 
2018; McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012). Typically, however, 
these dimensions are analysed separately, and the focus is often primarily on people’s 
degree of belief or concern about climate change, or the extent to which people deny 
that climate change is occurring. A handful of studies have examined how multiple 
dimensions of climate change opinion interact at the individual-level (Leiserowitz et al., 
2009; Maibach et al., 2011; Metag et al., 2017), although they do not include the 
dimension of issue salience. 
Relying on an original online survey conducted in the UK in August 2018, the 
current study investigates three dimensions of climate change opinion. In contrast to 
previous studies investigating multiple dimensions of climate change opinion, we 
examine not only belief in and concern about climate change, but also issue salience and 
support for government action on climate change. Issue salience can account for the 
differences in resolve to address climate change among those who believe that climate 
change is happening (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2014). Moreover, issue salience is likely to 
be critical in determining whether public opinion influences policy (Burstein, 2003), as 
it is a clear signal from the public on whether more needs to be done by the government 
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2004). Investigating these three dimensions, therefore, can help to 
create a clearer picture of the relationship between climate change views and climate 
policy than considering belief in climate change alone (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2014; 
Burstein, 2003; Hagen et al., 2016). We address two research questions in this study. 
First (descriptive), how do the three dimensions intersect at the individual level to form 
different ‘publics’ of climate change views? Second (explanatory), to what extent do 
sociopolitical characteristics relate to membership of these publics? 
Theory 
The dimensions of climate change opinion 
Research suggests that large majorities in most countries believe that climate change is 
occurring, and are concerned about it (Tranter and Booth, 2015). It could be inferred 
from these findings that policy-makers – who have so far failed to address climate 
change adequately – are ignoring public opinion by not adopting stronger climate 
policies. However, few of those who accept the science of climate change see it as a high 
3 
 
salience issue, or support government action to address it (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2014; 
Kotchen et al., 2017). Therefore, any hesitancy by climate policy-makers to adopt a 
more comprehensive policy programme may be due not to the public’s denial of climate 
change, but to the fact that the public views climate change as a low salience issue and 
are concerned about the consequences of government policy action. 
Given the multi-dimensional nature of climate change views, it is important to 
ensure that all relevant aspects are accounted for when analysing opinion on climate 
change. One tool to assist with identifying these relevant aspects is the concept of 
‘public will’. As Raile et al. (2014: 105) explain, public will is ‘a social system’s shared 
recognition of a particular problem and resolve to address the situation in a particular 
way through sustained collective action. Central to this definition are the ideas that 
many different “publics” can exist at any given time and that a public need not represent 
a majority of the population to be meaningful.’. Public will has two important 
implications for the current study. First, society comprises multiple publics with respect 
to particular issues, each with distinct views of an issue, which may not fit along a single 
dimension. Identifying and characterising each public with respect to these dimensions 
can allow us to get a better understanding of climate change opinion in the context of its 
possible effect on policy. 
Second, the concept of public will can be used to select the relevant dimensions 
of climate change opinion that define the different publics. A ‘shared recognition of the 
problem’ can be determined by investigating citizens’ belief in climate change and its 
causes, the certainty with which those views are held, and the degree of concern about 
the problem. Issue salience can be used to understand a public’s degree of ‘resolve to 
address the issue’. Finally, the ‘particular way’ in which each public believes the 
problem should be solved is interpreted here as the extent to which individuals believe 
government policy (as opposed to voluntary action by individuals and businesses) 
should be used to mitigate emissions. 
These dimensions of climate change opinion (belief and concern, salience, and 
support for government action) have been examined in previous studies, although most 
studies focus on one of the three dimensions (rather than combining them). Of the 
three, the belief and concern dimension has received by far the most attention (Knight, 
2016; Nisbet and Myers, 2007; Pew Research Center, 2015; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012), 
with research on belief often focussing on denial or scepticism (McCright and Dunlap, 
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2011; Poortinga et al., 2011; Tranter and Booth, 2015). Less attention has been paid to 
issue salience, even though it is generally agreed to be important for understanding 
climate change views because climate change appears to be of very low salience for 
much of the population (Bromley-Trujillo et al., 2014; Herrnstadt and Muehlegger, 
2014). Some previous research has examined support for government action to address 
climate change, often by examining the extent to which people are willing to pay higher 
taxes to address climate change, or whether they support or oppose particular policies 
(Kotchen et al., 2017; Maibach et al., 2011; McCright et al., 2013). 
In adopting the concept of public will, this study takes a ‘person-centred’ 
approach to investigate climate change opinion, rather than the ‘variable-centred’ 
approach typically used in quantitative social science research (Laursen and Hoff, 2006; 
Magnusson, 2003). A person-centred approach seeks to identify groups of individuals 
within a population that have similarities with respect to the specific measures under 
investigation (Laursen and Hoff, 2006). Such an approach offers two main advantages 
for the purposes of our study. First, identifying groups within a population fits well with 
the concept of public will, which suggests the existence of multiple publics. Second, a 
person-centred approach accounts for the various positions an individual may take on 
the three dimensions we investigate. For example, although many people may believe 
that climate change is happening, some see it as a high salience issue, whereas others 
only see it as medium or low salience. Two groups could thus be identified among those 
who believe in climate change: one where members believe in climate change and see it 
as high salience, and another where members also believe in climate change, but see it 
as medium or low salience. These two groups may have differences between them with 
respect to other measures of climate change opinion (for example, the extent to which 
they support the government taking action), and to predictors of group membership 
(such as demographic variables). Taking a person-centred approach, then, means that 
the opinions of the various groups within the population can be understood with 
greater clarity than if only a variable-centred approach was used, where the 
relationships between measures such as belief and salience can only be understood at 
the aggregate level (Laursen and Hoff, 2006). 
Previous research has used person-centred techniques to investigate climate 
change opinion, dividing individuals into ‘audience segments’. Using a latent class 
analysis of survey data, Leiserowitz et al. (2009) identify six segments of the American 
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public with various attitudes to climate change ranging from ‘alarmed’ to ‘dismissive’ 
(see also: Metag et al., 2017; Morrison et al., 2013). Importantly, however, these studies 
have mainly aimed at understanding how best to communicate with the different 
groups (hence the use of language such as ‘audience segments’) (Maibach et al., 2011). 
Additionally, the standard survey tools employed by these studies do not include 
questions on issue salience (Maibach et al., 2011). Yet, politicians are more likely to 
respond to public opinion if most people are not only concerned about climate change 
but also see it as highly salient (Burstein, 2003; Raile et al., 2014). Therefore, including 
issue salience in a person-centred analysis can lead to an improved understanding of 
how public opinion relates to policy, as it allows differentiation between people who are 
concerned, but see climate change as either a low or high salience issue. 
To form expectations about which publics we might find in the population, we 
examined the different possible combinations of positions on the three key dimensions: 
belief and concern, salience, and support for government action. These positions 
suggest four possible climate change publics, as summarised in table 1: the highly 
engaged, the moderately engaged, the non-interventionists and the deniers. While other 
combinations may also be possible (for instance, someone could support government 
action, despite not being concerned about climate change, or seeing it as high salience), 
these four outlooks are likely to be large enough to warrant investigation, based on 
previous research (e.g. Egan and Mullin, 2017; Leiserowitz et al., 2009; Tranter and 
Booth, 2015). 
 
Table 1 - Summary of possible climate change publics 
 Strong belief in and 
concern about 
climate change? 
See issue as high 
salience? 
Supports government 
action? 
Highly engaged Yes Yes Yes 
Moderately engaged Yes No Yes 
Non-interventionists Yes Yes/No No 
Deniers No No No 
In most countries, a committed group of citizens are deeply concerned about climate 
change, strongly support government action to address it, and – we anticipate – see 
climate change as a high salience issue (Leiserowitz et al., 2009). We refer to this public 
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as the ‘highly engaged’. Although most countries have a high proportion of highly 
concerned citizens, on average, climate change is rated as low salience (Bromley-
Trujillo et al., 2014; Egan and Mullin, 2017). We thus expect a large group of citizens to 
form the ‘moderately engaged’ public, whose members have high levels of belief that 
climate change is occurring, and would like the government to act on it, but tend to 
believe that other issues are more salient. Given that some citizens may be ideologically 
opposed to strong government regulations or economic intervention, we also expect 
there will be a ‘non-interventionist’ public, which has high levels of belief that climate 
change is happening, may or may not view it as highly salient, but does not support 
strong government action on climate change (Drews and van den Bergh, 2016). Many 
studies have confirmed that sections of the population in most countries do not believe 
climate change is happening, or is a serious threat (Tranter and Booth, 2015). We thus 
anticipate a ‘denier’ public to have strong beliefs that climate change does not exist, or 
that it is not a serious threat, and therefore will not see climate change as high salience, 
or support government action to address it. 
Additionally, some individuals will not fit into any of these categories, such as 
those who are uncertain or ambivalent about climate change. We refer to this group as 
the ‘uncertain’. Their positions on the three main dimensions are more difficult to 
establish from the existing literature. However, previous research has indicated a 
substantial proportion of the public are uncertain about whether climate change is 
occurring, and what should be done about it (Hagen et al., 2016; Poortinga et al., 2011). 
A person-centred approach can identify whether or not the uncertain is a genuine 
‘public’, or merely a catch-all for individuals who do not fit into the other publics. 
Consistent climate change views among members of the uncertain group (for instance, 
having similar ideas about the seriousness of climate change), and similarities in the 
sociopolitical profile of members of the uncertain group would both be indications that 
the group is a genuine, separate public. As uncertainty about climate change has 
previously been found to be common, we expect individuals forming the uncertain 
group to have consistent views on many aspects of climate change, and that our analysis 
will help to more clearly define what these views are. 
Climate change opinion in the UK 
Turning to the specific case investigated in this study, the UK is a country which has 
been at the forefront of climate change policy. In 2008, the UK passed the Climate 
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Change Act 2008, which has been seen as one of the most innovative and 
comprehensive pieces of climate change legislation adopted at the national level 
(Fankhauser et al., 2018). Existing research shows that public opinion about climate 
change is similar in the UK to most other developed countries. In particular, most 
people in the UK are concerned about climate change, with a 2015 Pew Research Center 
poll reporting that 77% of people in the UK believe that climate change is a very or 
somewhat serious problem (Pew Research Center, 2015). Absolute denial or scepticism 
about climate change is relatively rare in the UK, although some studies have found that 
many people are uncertain about whether or not climate change is happening 
(Poortinga et al., 2011; Taylor, Dessai, et al., 2014; Whitmarsh, 2011). These levels of 
concern and denial appear to be relatively stable over time. 
Despite the reasonably strong belief and concern about climate change in the UK, 
salience of the issue is low (Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006). For example, a 2016 study 
found that only two percent of respondents in the UK said ‘climate change’ was the most 
important issue facing the country (in response to an open-ended question) (Steentjes 
et al., 2017). People tend to be more worried about issues such as the economy, 
healthcare and immigration instead (Steentjes et al., 2017). Even when compared with 
other environmental issues, climate change tends to receive a low ranking (Nisbet and 
Myers, 2007). 
There is a reasonable degree of support in the UK for government policy to 
address climate change (Rietig and Laing, 2017), although support is typically for 
policies that would not result in higher prices being passed on to consumers 
(Kantenbacher et al., 2018). The British public tends to believe responsibility for action 
on climate change rests primarily with national governments, international 
organisations, and businesses rather than with individuals (Pidgeon, 2012; Spence et al., 
2010). 
To summarise the expectations relating to the first research question, we expect 
each of the four publics to be found in the UK, given that UK opinion on climate change 
is fairly similar to that in other developed countries. In addition, we expect a fifth group 
(the uncertain) to consist of a collection of views that do not fit into the four main 
publics. 
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Sociopolitical characteristics of the publics 
Investigating climate change opinion using a person-centred approach allows for 
analysis of the sociopolitical profile of each of the publics, which is the second research 
question addressed in this study. Previous research conducted in developed countries 
has investigated the sociopolitical characteristics of people with particular climate 
change views, finding that age, political orientation, education level, and socioeconomic 
status often relate to people’s outlook on climate change (Knight, 2016; McCright and 
Dunlap, 2011; Poortinga et al., 2011; Tranter and Booth, 2015; van der Linden, 2017). 
Given that the relationship between sociopolitical characteristics and climate change 
views can vary across countries (Poortinga et al., 2019; Tranter and Booth, 2015), it is 
important to consider the specific context of the UK. 
In the UK, older people with below average income are more likely to be 
sceptical of climate change (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; Clements, 2012; Poortinga et 
al., 2011). Previous research has also revealed that those with lower levels of education 
are more likely to be sceptical about climate change (Capstick and Pidgeon, 2014; 
Clements, 2012), and there is some evidence that men are also more likely to be deniers 
(Clements, 2012). Few studies have examined the differences in climate change views in 
the UK among different ethnicities, although Clements (2012) finds some evidence that 
those who identify as white are more likely to be supportive of tackling climate change. 
The theoretical explanations for why such demographic characteristics relate to 
climate change views are, however, rarely considered (van der Linden, 2017). One 
plausible explanation is that post-material values, often found to be positively 
correlated to belief in climate change (Kvaloy et al., 2012; Mostafa, 2016), are also 
associated with being younger and on a higher income (Moors, 2003). Gender 
differences can be explained by women tending to be socialised to have higher levels of 
empathy than men, leading them to hold stronger pro-environmental attitudes (Milfont 
and Sibley, 2016). Several studies have suggested that the effect of education on climate 
change views does not come from the inability of those with less education to 
understand the science of climate change, but is instead related to the political 
orientation of the highly educated (Hamilton, 2011; Hamilton et al., 2015; Kahan et al., 
2012). In other words, it seems that the highly educated are more able than those with 
less education to receive political cues on climate change, and engage in motivated 
reasoning that aligns with their existing ideology (Hamilton et al., 2015; Kahan, 2015). 
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Overall, demographic differences in climate change views seem to be related to 
differences in political and environmental values (Dietz et al., 2005). 
Unlike the US, views on climate change in the UK do not seem to be starkly 
politically polarised. While there is evidence that Labour voters tend to believe climate 
change is a more serious problem than Conservatives, it is a much smaller gap than that 
between Republican and Democrat supporters in the US (Pew Research Center, 2015). 
Clements (2012) finds that those on the right in the UK are more likely to be sceptical 
about climate change. Political orientation may be connected to climate change views 
through motivated reasoning, where individuals evaluate information about a topic 
based on their existing ideological precepts, rather than on its objective truth (Kahan, 
2015, 2016). Alternatively, people may simply dismiss information sources as not 
credible if the information provided by the sources does not conform to their existing 
beliefs or ideology (Druckman and McGrath, 2019). 
We have clear expectations, then, about the sociopolitical characteristics of the 
highly engaged and denier publics. In particular, we expect members of the former to be 
typically younger, more left-leaning, more highly educated and with a higher than 
average income, while the denier public will be older, more right-leaning, less highly 
educated, and with a lower than average income. Given the lack of existing research on 
the other publics, developing expectations about their sociopolitical characteristics is 
more challenging. Overall, we expect the moderately engaged to be similar to the highly 
engaged, and the non-interventionists and uncertain to be similar to the deniers. 
Data and Method 
To gain a better understanding of the dimensions of climate change opinion, we 
conducted an original online survey in the UK. Respondents were recruited through the 
online platform ‘Prolific’, a UK-based service where individuals can sign up to 
participate in surveys, receiving a small payment in return. Researchers post the details 
of their survey, including any pre-screening criteria, and the Prolific system emails 
eligible participants. Prolific is similar to Amazon MTurk (a platform that has been used 
for a number of studies (Buhrmester et al., 2011)); however, Prolific is designed 
specifically for surveys, and caters more to academic researchers (Peer et al., 2017). 
While previous research has shown that social science studies conducted using Prolific 
have similar results to those conducted using more traditional respondent pools (Palan 
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and Schitter, 2017; Peer et al., 2017), we applied weightings (based on gender, age, 
education and ethnicity) to the responses to reduce some of the sample’s bias.1 
The survey comprised questions (many of which were based on those used by 
Maibach et al. (2011)) on the three dimensions of climate change investigated in this 
study: belief in and concern about climate change, issue salience, and support for 
government action. Additionally, respondents were asked about their sociopolitical 
characteristics, including age, gender, education, income, political orientation, and party 
preference. A detailed description of the variables can be found in section 1 of the 
supplemental material. Two variables warrant explanation here: belief in climate 
change and issue salience. The belief measure is derived from two survey questions, the 
first asking ‘Do you think that climate change is happening?’ (with responses being ‘yes’, 
‘no’ or ‘don’t know’), and the second asking ‘How certain are you that climate change 
is/isn’t happening?’, with responses on a five point scale, ranging from ‘not at all certain’ 
to ‘extremely certain’. The belief variable was coded by assigning 1 to those who are 
extremely or very certain climate change is not happening, and 7 to those who are 
extremely or very certain climate change is happening, with remaining responses 
placed accordingly along the scale. Second, salience – which we define as the perceived 
importance of an issue for the country relative to other issues – was measured by asking 
participants to rank eight issues from the most to least important to the country. The 
salience variable is coded as the ranking each participant gave to climate change, with 1 
indicating that the participant sees climate change as the most important of the eight 
issues, and 8 indicating the participant sees it as the least important. 
The survey was conducted in late August 2018, at the end of the hottest British 
summer on record (BBC, 2018). Previous research has shown that people tend to 
become more concerned about climate change after experiencing unusual weather 
patterns (Taylor, Bruine de Bruin, et al., 2014), an effect which tends to be particularly 
strong for recent weather events. It is likely, then, that more people in the UK were 
concerned about climate change at the time of the survey than if there had been a more 
                                                        
1 A more detailed discussion of the method employed, including data collection, application of 
weights and the list of variables can be found in section 1 of the supplemental material. 
Descriptive statistics and the text of the survey are presented in sections 2 and 6 of the 
supplemental material, respectively. The results of the latent class and multinomial regression 
analyses presented below were roughly the same whether or not weightings were used. 
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historically typical summer. Respondents were all British citizens, aged 18 and over and 
currently resident in the UK. 820 people completed the survey. After respondents were 
removed for not being resident in the UK, missing data or failing two attention checks, 
787 respondents were included in our final sample.2 To ensure that answers to the 
salience question were not affected by priming, the initial purpose of the survey was 
withheld from respondents, and the survey was instead advertised as being about 
‘important political issues’. After survey responses were submitted, a debrief message 
was displayed to respondents explaining the true purpose of the survey. 
The data were analysed using a latent class analysis with Mplus 8.2. Two 
separate analyses were conducted. In the first analysis, addressing the first research 
question, a measurement model was selected by investigating models with different 
numbers of classes, and reviewing the fit statistics and substantive interpretation to 
select the appropriate model. In the second analysis, addressing the second research 
question, sociopolitical covariates were introduced. This was done using the ‘three-step’ 
method, where the covariates are regressed on a manifest class variable, which also 
takes into account the uncertainty of classification for individuals (Asparouhov and 
Muthén, 2014). For the second analysis, observations with missing values for the 
independent variables were dropped, meaning 740 observations were included. 
Results 
Latent Class Analysis 
We conducted a latent class analysis using the indicator variables. Models allowing for 
between one and eight classes were investigated. The runs for models consisting of six, 
seven and eight classes did not produce duplicated log-likelihood values, and therefore 
were considered not well-identified. Fit statistics are presented for the remaining 
models in table 2. 
 
                                                        
2 The first attention check began by mentioning climate change and the news, but then 
requested that respondents select the ‘Not at all interested’ option. The second attention check 
was a question about a short article on climate change and policy respondents were asked to 
read. The question asked respondents to select one of four statements that summarised the text 
they had read. The text, and associated questions, were part of an experiment, the results of 
which are not included in this paper. 
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Table 2 - Model fit statistics 
Classes  Parameters  LL  BIC  SABIC  CAIC  AWE  BF  Entropy  
1  54  -12681.15  25722.39  25550.91  25776.39  25803.39  1121.06  -  
2  109  -11376.72  23480.28  23134.15  23589.28  23643.78  335.67  0.902  
3  164  -10857.67  22808.94  22288.15  22972.94  23054.94  2.90  0.91  
4  219  -10671.40  22803.13  22107.69  23022.13  23131.63  -46.86  0.898  
5  274  -10534.88  22896.85  22026.76  23170.85  23307.85  -  0.871  
Note:  
LL = log-likelihood; BIC = Bayesian Information Criterion; SABIC = Sample-size adjusted BIC; CAIC = 
Consistent Akaike Information Criterion; AWE = Approximate Weight of Evidence Criterion; BF = Bayes 
Factor; Bolded values indicate "best" fit for each respective statistic. Models for 6, 7 and 8 class 
solutions were also run, but are not displayed here as they were not well identified. 
 
 
 
These statistics indicate that the three, four or five class models all have a good 
fit for the data. Although the CAIC and AWE statistics point to a three class model, and 
the BIC statistic points to a four class model, for substantive reasons we selected the five 
class model as the preferred model. In the three and four class models, the classes were 
harder to interpret. For instance, the class that could be labelled the ‘highly engaged’ in 
the three and four class models had higher response probabilities for the lower salience 
categories than in the five class model. Additionally, those who are uncertain tended to 
be spread across the classes. There are sufficient differences between the moderately 
engaged and non-interventionist publics to aid in substantive interpretation of the data. 
Moreover, these two classes have different sociopolitical profiles (see below).3 
Table 3 displays a summary of the results of the latent class model as well as the 
class labels that were assigned to each of the classes.4 Four of the five classes fit well 
with the publics (and the uncertain group) that had been derived from the literature 
(see table 1). However, the fifth (the non-interventionists) differed from our 
expectations. Although members of this public are less willing to pay higher taxes to 
                                                        
3 Local independence checks for the five class model showed some pairs of indicators had 
significant bivariate residuals (Asparouhov and Muthén, 2015). We therefore investigated 
alternative models which included residual covariances. These models produced similar results 
to the initial five class model. We therefore selected the initial five class model on the basis that 
it was the most parsimonious. 
4 The full results of the latent class analysis can be found in section 3 of the supplemental 
material. 
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address climate change, the model predicts that members of this public have a 0.57 
probability of believing that the government is not doing enough to address climate 
change. For this reason, we relabelled the non-interventionists as the ‘action-wary’. 
 
Table 3 - Summary of latent classes 
 
Mean or Probability (Standard Error In Brackets) 
Variable  Scale  Highly 
Engaged  
Moderately 
Engaged  
Action-
wary  
Uncertain  Deniers  
Latent class prevalence  -  0.170 
(0.058)  
0.293 
(0.054)  
0.328 
(0.032)  
0.147 
(0.022)  
0.062 
(0.014)  
Relative salience of 
climate change  
1-8  3.473 
(0.376)  
5.284 
(0.426)  
6.956 
(0.172)  
7.426 
(0.134)  
7.239 
(0.329)  
Belief in climate change  1-7  7.000 
(0.000)  
6.898 
(0.033)  
6.498 
(0.133)  
5.260 
(0.235)  
2.757 
(1.472)  
Human causation 
(probability)  
-  0.947 
(0.055)  
0.890 
(0.036)  
0.740 
(0.049)  
0.384 
(0.071)  
0.036 
(0.036)  
Scientific consensus 
(probability)  
-  0.954 
(0.034)  
0.813 
(0.044)  
0.716 
(0.042)  
0.585 
(0.074)  
0.203 
(0.122)  
Climate change harming 
people now (probability)  
-  0.788 
(0.052)  
0.654 
(0.049)  
0.244 
(0.055)  
0.052 
(0.037)  
0.053 
(0.060)  
Seriousness  1-5  4.959 
(0.029)  
4.528 
(0.141)  
3.896 
(0.081)  
2.812 
(0.101)  
1.718 
(0.187)  
Personal importance  1-5  4.721 
(0.213)  
3.896 
(0.103)  
2.957 
(0.073)  
1.798 
(0.156)  
1.251 
(0.087)  
How informed 
respondent feels about 
climate change  
1-5  3.717 
(0.197)  
2.982 
(0.091)  
2.509 
(0.067)  
2.125 
(0.116)  
2.679 
(0.197)  
Government priority of 
climate change  
1-4  3.488 
(0.113)  
2.863 
(0.155)  
2.114 
(0.053)  
1.492 
(0.099)  
1.000 
(0.000)  
Importance of jobs and 
prices for policy  
1-5  3.191 
(0.124)  
3.386 
(0.125)  
3.128 
(0.077)  
2.717 
(0.167)  
2.443 
(0.258)  
Government policy 
preferred to finding own 
solutions (probability)  
-  0.970 
(0.018)  
0.903 
(0.032)  
0.771 
(0.037)  
0.594 
(0.069)  
0.158 
(0.100)  
Willingness to pay higher 
taxes  
1-5  4.043 
(0.241)  
3.179 
(0.121)  
2.532 
(0.115)  
1.716 
(0.107)  
1.071 
(0.056)  
Government is not doing 
enough (probability)  
-  0.957 
(0.038)  
0.786 
(0.068)  
0.567 
(0.045)  
0.242 
(0.069)  
0.000 
(0.000)  
Note:  
Means calculated from values estimated by latent class model 
 
The highly engaged public has a prevalence of 0.17. All members of this public 
have a very strong belief that climate change is occurring, and typically rank climate 
change as one of the three most important issues. They are also very likely to believe 
that climate change is an extremely serious problem, is caused by humans and that 
there is scientific consensus on climate change. Although the highly engaged feel the 
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most informed of the five publics, many members of this public still feel unsure about 
their own knowledge of climate change, with a mean score of 3.7 (on a five point scale) 
in response to the question about how informed they feel about climate change. Not 
surprisingly, the highly engaged feel that the government is not doing enough about 
climate change, that climate change should be a very high priority for the government, 
and is best addressed by government policy. 
The moderately engaged public is the second largest of the five publics, with a 
prevalence of 0.29. Like the highly engaged, they have a very strong belief that climate 
change is occurring, and are certain in that belief, having a mean score on the seven 
point belief scale of 6.9, just below the highly engaged. However, the moderately 
engaged tend to rank climate change as only a medium or low priority compared with 
other issues. In other respects, they are quite similar to highly engaged citizens, being 
confident about the scientific consensus, human causes and extremely serious nature of 
climate change. The moderately engaged are less willing than the highly engaged to pay 
much higher taxes to address climate change, and believe that climate change should be 
only a high (as opposed to very high) priority for the government. 
The action-wary public is the largest group, having a prevalence of 0.33. They 
have a high level of belief that climate change is occurring, only slightly below the 
moderately and highly engaged. However, they see climate change as a very low 
salience issue, having a 0.73 probability of ranking climate change as either the seventh 
or eighth most important out of the eight issues. They are reasonably confident that 
climate change is caused by humans, and that scientists agree on climate change, but are 
relatively unlikely to believe climate change is affecting people now. With respect to 
government action, the action-wary tend to believe the government is not doing enough 
to address climate change, having a 0.57 probability of providing this response. 
However, they believe that climate change should be only a medium priority for the 
government, and most are unwilling to pay higher taxes to address climate change. 
The uncertain (prevalence 0.15) believe, on average, that climate change is 
occurring, but are not certain about their beliefs. They view climate change as having 
very low salience, giving it a mean ranking of 7.43 out of the eight issues. The uncertain 
are very unlikely to believe climate change is harming people now, although they see it 
as a moderately serious problem. They feel the least informed of the five publics, having 
a probability of 0.72 of feeling slightly or not at all informed about climate change. For 
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the questions asking when people will be harmed by climate change and how the 
government is performing on climate change, members of the uncertain public are more 
likely to answer ‘don’t know’ than to provide any other response. 
Finally, the deniers are the smallest public, having a prevalence of 0.06. Most 
deniers do not believe that climate change is happening, although they are not overly 
confident in this belief, having only a 0.29 probability of being extremely or fairly 
certain that climate change is not happening. They believe that climate change is a low 
salience issue, with their mean ranking being slightly less than that of the uncertain. 
Deniers do not attribute climate change to humans, and do not believe that scientists 
agree about climate change. Most deniers believe that climate change should be a low 
priority for the government, and that businesses and individuals should find their own 
solutions to climate change. 
Sociopolitical Covariates 
Turning to our explanatory research question, we conducted a multinomial logistic 
regression of the sociopolitical covariates on latent class membership. Below, we 
present predicted probabilities plots for the five variables that appeared to have 
statistically significant relationships with the probability that an individual is a member 
of a public: age, political orientation, income, education and gender.5 The other variables 
we investigated (ethnicity and party preference) do not seem to have a clear 
relationship with latent class membership. A table presenting the regression results can 
be found in section 4 of the supplemental material. The dashed line in each figure below 
indicates the overall probability of membership of each latent class. 
As illustrated in figure 1, age has a moderate effect on membership of the highly 
and moderately engaged, with younger people being more likely to be members of both 
publics. Contrary to our expectations, age does not seem to affect the probability of a 
person being a member of the action-wary. However, in line with our expectations, 
older people have a higher probability of being deniers than younger people. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
                                                        
5 The predicted probabilities were calculated using marginal standardisation rather than 
holding the other variables in the model at their means. This method has been shown to 
produce more accurate results for non-linear models (Muller and MacLehose, 2014). Confidence 
intervals were obtained by non-parametric bootstrapping. 
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The link between left-right political orientation and latent class membership 
(figure 2) is as expected. Left wing voters are more likely to be members of the highly 
and moderately engaged than the deniers. Individuals on the far right of the spectrum 
have a probability close to zero of belonging to the highly engaged, while those on the 
left have a probability of over 0.4. The action-wary, deniers and uncertain have opposite 
trends, with members being more likely to have a right than left-wing orientation.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
Income also shows a statistically significant relationship with latent class 
membership (figure 3). However, contrary to our expectations, those in lower income 
categories are more likely to be members of the highly and moderately engaged than 
the deniers, compared with people on a higher income. To further explore the effect of 
income, we ran ordinal logistic regression analyses for each of the categorical indicators 
of climate change opinion separately (the results are presented in section 5 of the 
supplemental material). These analyses show that, while people on higher incomes are 
more likely to believe that climate change is happening than people on lower incomes, 
people on higher incomes see climate change as a less serious issue, and believe that it 
should be a lower priority for the government than those on lower incomes. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Individuals with a tertiary degree are statistically more likely to be members of 
the highly engaged public, and less likely to be members of the uncertain group than 
those without a degree (figure 4). Holding a degree does not seem to significantly affect 
membership of any of the other publics. The ordinal logistic regression presented in 
section 5 of the supplemental material, which analyses the different dimensions of 
climate change opinion separately, also suggests that holding a degree tends to be 
associated with viewing climate change as a high salience issue and supporting 
government action rather than belief in the existence of climate change. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Finally, the multinomial logistic regression reveals that men tend to be more 
likely than women to be members of the highly engaged (figure 5). Yet, gender does not 
seem to affect the probability of membership of any of the other publics. Given that 
women are typically more concerned about climate change (Clements, 2012; McCright 
and Dunlap, 2011), this is a somewhat surprising result. The results of the ordinal 
logistic regression (see section 5 in the supplemental material) indicate that women 
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(compared with men) tend to view climate change as less serious, and also feel less 
informed about climate change. 
Overall, our analysis shows that the latent classes defined in the previous section 
can be thought of as genuine publics whose members not only tend to have similar 
views on climate change, but also share sociopolitical characteristics. They also tend to 
be of similar age, and place themselves at similar positions on the left-right political 
spectrum. Despite having much in common in their views on climate change, the 
moderately engaged and action-wary have quite different sociopolitical characteristics: 
the moderately engaged are left-leaning while the action-wary are right-leaning. The 
sociopolitical differences between the publics also add support to the selection of a five 
class model, as opposed to the three or four class models in which the moderately 
engaged and action-wary would not have been defined as separate classes. Finally, our 
results indicate that the uncertain can be considered a coherent ‘public’, rather than 
simply a collection of individuals, as members have similar views on many measures, 
and have some sociopolitical similarities. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of our study was to provide a detailed understanding of public opinion about 
climate change by using a person-centred approach to identify different ‘publics’. We 
investigated three dimensions of climate change opinion: belief in and concern about 
climate change, issue salience and support for government action. Our results 
demonstrate that incorporating multiple dimensions when analysing opinion on climate 
change creates a detailed and precise picture of what people think about climate change 
and how it might be addressed. This picture suggests that – in the UK context at least – 
deniers are only a small section of society. As younger and left-wing people were over-
represented in the sample used in our study, the size of the denier public may be 
somewhat larger than reported here: other studies place denial of climate change in the 
UK between 10 and 12% (Steentjes et al., 2017; Tranter and Booth, 2015). Yet, the 
attention paid to climate change denial – in both the popular and academic literature – 
appears to be out of proportion given the current size of the denier public. Moreover, 
those who have a strong belief that climate change is happening have a diverse range of 
views that can be better captured by use of a person-centred approach. 
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The majority of the UK population seems to fit into either the ‘moderately 
engaged’ or ‘action-wary’ publics, both of which are certain in their belief that climate 
change is occurring, but differ in their degree of support for government action on 
climate change. Which one of these publics an individual is a member of appears to be 
related to their political orientation: left-wing people tend to be moderately engaged, 
while right-wing people tend to be action-wary. The moderately engaged and action-
wary have similar climate views to the highly engaged, with the main difference being 
that they see climate change as low or medium salience, whereas the highly engaged 
believe it to be high salience. Given the large sizes of the moderately engaged and 
action-wary in the UK, the beliefs of these publics is an area that future research could 
pay more attention to. 
Like the ‘Six Americas’ study (Leiserowitz et al., 2009), the publics that we 
identified can be ordered from the most to least engaged with climate change with 
respect to almost all the indicator variables. This is different from the initial model that 
we proposed, where we expected some members of a ‘non-interventionist’ public to feel 
that climate change is a high salience issue, but to prefer to address it through non-
governmental action rather than governmental action such as paying higher taxes. 
Instead, it appears that most people in the action-wary public acknowledge that 
government policy is the appropriate way to address climate change. This suggests that 
‘hard’ ideological opposition to government action on climate change is not particularly 
prevalent in the UK, and any hesitancy about government action is a relatively ‘soft’ 
concern, perhaps related to seeing other (policy) issues as more important. 
Of the sociopolitical variables we considered, age and left-right political 
orientation have the clearest relationship to membership of the publics. The fact that 
older people are more likely to be deniers, while younger people are more likely to be 
highly or moderately engaged suggests that post-material values – which are more 
commonly found among younger people (Moors, 2003) – are influencing climate change 
views. Additionally, the effect of age on membership of the publics could be explained 
by the lower levels of environmental concern (which is linked to climate change 
scepticism) among older people (Whitmarsh, 2011), as well as a preference for 
maintaining existing social structures which older people are typically more a part of 
than younger people (Jylhä and Akrami, 2015; Poortinga et al., 2019). 
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Those on the left are significantly more likely to be highly engaged than those on 
the right, while members of the action-wary, uncertain and deniers tend to be mostly 
right wing. However, party preference did not seem to relate to membership of the 
publics, suggesting that the relationship between political orientation and climate 
change views is not about partisanship – as it may be in the US (Bolsen and Druckman, 
2018; van der Linden, 2017) – but is rather related to people’s wider environmental 
values. It is likely that individuals on the right engage in motivated reasoning to deny or 
doubt climate science, the implications of which threaten their individualistic world 
views (Kahan, 2016; Kahan et al., 2012). 
Our analyses also revealed that education, gender and income are related to 
membership of the publics. We find support for previous research on the link between 
education and climate change opinion, with people who possess a degree having a 
higher probability of being a member of the highly engaged, and a lower probability of 
being a member of the uncertain public, compared with those without a degree. Gender 
and income relate to membership of the publics in ways that were unexpected given the 
results of previous research. Men having a higher probability of being members of the 
highly engaged public compared with women appears to be due to women tending to 
view climate change as less serious and feeling less informed about it, compared with 
men. Similarly, those on a higher income are less likely to be members of the highly or 
moderately engaged than those on a lower income. While there is little difference in 
belief in climate change among income categories, people on higher incomes tend to be 
more hesitant to back government action on climate change than those on lower 
incomes. 
Our results therefore underline the importance of considering multiple 
dimensions of climate change opinion (rather than just belief and concern), as the 
relationship between sociopolitical measures and the different dimensions of climate 
change views may be complex. This complexity may help to explain the inconsistent 
results of previous studies investigating the relationship between climate change views 
and various sociopolitical variables (Hornsey et al., 2016; van der Linden, 2017). 
Moreover, our use of both person-centred and variable-centred analyses (which 
Laursen and Hoff (2006: 383) argue are ‘complementary rather than competing 
approaches’) allow us to understand the complexity of the relationship between climate 
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change views and sociopolitical variables, and to illustrate how the sociopolitical 
covariates relate to the climate change publics in the UK. 
More broadly, the characterisation of the publics in terms of both climate change 
opinion and sociopolitical covariates illustrates the value of using a person-centred 
approach to investigate climate change views. In particular, a person-centred approach 
allows us to move beyond the believer-sceptic dichotomy adopted by many previous 
studies on climate change opinion (Corry and Jørgensen, 2015). As our results 
demonstrate, there are many differences among climate change ‘believers’, with respect 
to both salience and support for government action. Additionally, a person-centred 
approach allowed us to reveal the variation in the relationships between the 
sociopolitical covariates and climate change views across different sections of the 
population (Laursen and Hoff, 2006). 
One criticism that may be raised against the validity of the findings presented in 
this study is our reliance on a non-probability sample. While sample weights were 
employed in our analyses, this is unlikely to have removed all of the bias. Caution is 
therefore required for generalising the relative sizes of the publics. This is particularly 
so for the deniers, due to older and right-leaning people – who tend to be more likely to 
deny the existence of climate change – being under-represented in the sample. Despite 
this, the prevalences do give us a broad indication of the sizes of the publics, which is 
confirmed by the fact that they are comparable to similar previous research 
(Leiserowitz et al., 2009; Steentjes et al., 2017). Moreover, given that sample weights 
did not substantially affect the results of our analyses and that the main viewpoints on 
climate change in the UK are likely to be captured in this sample (and, thus, the latent 
class model), we believe that the results present an accurate picture of public opinion 
on climate change in the UK. As a person-centred analysis of climate change opinion has 
not been previously conducted in the UK, future research using a probability sample 
could help to confirm these results. Such a study could also include a wider range of 
questions and incorporate other dimensions of climate change views, such as the degree 
to which people engage in individual actions (for example, limiting personal emissions 
or engaging in political activism) to help address climate change. 
With respect to the wider question of whether public opinion plays a role in the 
inadequate climate change policy adopted in many countries, this paper can only offer 
an initial answer with reference to the concept of public will. As noted by Raile et al. 
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(2014), politicians do not necessarily respond to the preferences of the majority of the 
public when selecting policies. Other aspects of public opinion, such as people’s resolve 
to address the issue (or issue salience), are also important. A small public with a high 
degree of resolve – such as the highly engaged – may be able to influence policy, and this 
appears to have been a factor in the UK adopting the robust policy framework of the 
Climate Change Act 2008 (Carter and Childs, 2018). However, given what is known 
about the role of salience in the extent to which policy-makers respond to public 
opinion (Burstein, 2003), caution is warranted. While the UK has made better progress 
than most, there is the perception among some experts that this progress is fragile 
(Fankhauser et al., 2018), and further progress could easily be stalled in the face of 
other political crises that may arise. 
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